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Commercial Arbitration 
in the  
Islamic Middle East 
Arthur J. Gemmell∗ 
Introduction 
As any observer of the international commercial scene will attest, globalization 
has spawned an untold number of daily international business transactions.  From 
these transactions, disputes arose and states worried that their domestic court 
system would be unable to deal with foreign commercial disputes expeditiously 
and equitably. In order to both address these concerns and to promote the use of 
international arbitration, a host of international and regional conventions was 
established to deal with the peaceful settlement of disputes.  The Islamic Middle 
East has not fully embraced what might be euphemistically referred to as a 
“modern” arbitral system.  
To comprehend the nature of dispute settlement in the Islamic Middle East, this 
paper contends that knowing “the law” of the Middle East is insufficient.  The 
lawyer-scholar must accept and internalize the fact that history and religion are the 
keys to understanding commercial arbitration in this part of the world.  
Part I of this article will briefly examine the historical and religious antecedents 
that have spawned the dynamics of today’s commercial arbitration world in the 
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Islamic Middle East.  While it may seem unconventional to begin a law article on 
commercial arbitration with a religious and historical retrospective, as this one 
will, it is critical to do so in order to provide the proper foundation to comprehend 
the law of this region.  
Islamic law pervades the commercial world, as well as a Muslim’s way of life.  
Islam is “a complete way of life: a religion, an ethic, and a legal system all in 
one.”1  Din—the Arabic word for religion, “. . . encompasses theology, scripture, 
politics, morality, law, justice, and all other aspects of life relating to the thoughts 
or actions of men . . . it is not that religion dominates the life of a faithful Moslem, 
but that religion . . . is his life.”2 
If the foreign investor and her counsel fail to comprehend the religious 
underpinnings supporting commercial arbitration in the Islamic Middle East, they 
may well find themselves in a dispute resolution system that will shroud their 
investment with ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Part II of this article will analyze the workings of the various commercial 
arbitration systems in the Islamic Middle East — a vast area encompassing 
eighteen countries (excluding Israel, Palestine, and Turkey), whose footprint on the 
planet measures some 14.5 million square kilometers inhabited by 350 million 
people. 
This analysis will demonstrate that due to the pervasiveness of regional 
historical and religious mandates, the implementation of a “modern” commercial 
arbitration system has been spotty, at best.  For an international commercial 
arbitral system to be effective, private arbitral agreements and awards must be 
enforced.  The arbitral system provides even successful commercial enterprises 
doing business in the Islamic Middle East with unpredictable enforcement of 
arbitral remedies. 
Lastly, the article will suggest an approach that walks the line between the 
religious and commercial worlds in order to heighten the efficacy of commercial 
arbitration in the Islamic Middle East. 
 
 1. ALL'AMAH SAYYID M.H. TABATABA’I, THE QUR’AN IN ISLAM: ITS IMPACT AND 
INFLUENCE ON THE LIFE OF MUSLIMS, 86 (1987) (citing Amir Khoury, Ancient and Islamic 
Sources of Intellectual Property Protection in the Middle East: A Focus on Trademarks, 43 
IDEA 151, 199 (2003). 
 2. Id. (citing D.S. ROBERTS, ISLAM: A WESTERNER’S GUIDE-FROM BUSINESS AND THE LAW 
TO SOCIAL CUSTOMS AND FAMILY LIFE, 67-68 (1982)). 
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PART I 
A.  The Shariah 
Islamic law is known as the Shariah and has four primary sources.3  Divided 
into 114 Surahs (chapters) and 6,666 verses, the Koran is the primary source for 
the Shariah, as it is considered by Muslims to be the revealed word of God in the 
Arabic language through the Prophet Muhammad (570-632 AD).4 
The Sunna are the second primary sources of the Shariah.  Sunna are the 
sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, having been recorded into what 
is known as the Hadith.  Sunna are deemed secondary sources inasmuch as the 
primary source, the Koran, is held to be the literal word of God.5 
Thirdly, Ijma, usually translated as “consensus,” becomes a valid source of 
Islamic law only after there has been widespread consultation (Shu’ra) by Islamic 
scholars and the use of juristic reasoning (Itjihad).6  As evidence of his support for 
Ijma, Akaddaf cites the Prophet Muhammad, “[m]y nation will not agree 
unanimously in error.”7 
And lastly, Qiyas are legal principles arrived at by analogy or analogical 
deduction.  However, the logic utilized must be based on the Koran, Sunna or Ijma.  
Khaliq writes that Qiyas are often used to apply Islamic principles to the modern 
era.8 
So important is the Shariah, that it is either a primary source or the primary 
source of law in the constitutions of Syria, Egypt, Kuwait, Yemen, Bahrain, Qatar, 
and the United Arab Emirates.9 
Neither Saudi Arabia nor Oman has formal constitutions and each apply the 
Shariah as the only Islamic law.10 The Saudi “Constitution” was enacted as The 
Basic Law of Government;11 Oman’s as The Basic Law of the Sultanate of 
 
 3. The sources for the Shariah come from Urfan Khaliq, Beyond the Veil?:  An Analysis of the 
Provisions of the Women’s Convention in the Law as Stipulated by the Shari’ah", 2 BUFF. 
JOUR. INT’L L. 1, 8-12 (1995). 
 4. ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLE, I (1992). 
 5. Khaliq, supra note 3, at 9. 
 6. Id. at 11. 
 7. FatimaAkaddaf, Application Of The United Nations Convention on Contracts For The 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) To Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible 
With Islamic Law Principles?, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 18 (2001). 
 8. Khaliq, supra note 3, at 12. 
 9. SAMIR SALEH, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST, 11-12 (2d ed. 
1984). 
 10. Id. at 12. 
 11. BASIC LAW OF GOVERNMENT [Constitution] art. 1 (Saudi Arabia), Adopted by Royal 
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Oman.12 
At Chapter 1, Article 1, the Saudi Basic Law states, “[t]he Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its religion; God’s Book and 
the Sunnah of His Prophet, God’s prayers and peace be upon him, are its 
constitution . . . .”  Supplemental Saudi laws (relating to various aspects of modern 
life) are called “regulations” and enjoy the full effect of law, provided they are 
consistent with Shariah law.13 
Similarly, the Omani Basic Law proclaims at Article 2, “[t]he religion of the 
State is Islam and the Islamic Shariah is the basis of legislation.” 
B.  Islamic Schools of Interpretation 
To compound the difficulty of comprehending commercial arbitration in the 
Islamic Middle East, another ingredient has to be added to the mix: the schools of 
interpretation of Islam.  The two major interpretive groups of Islam are the Sunni 
and the Shi’a.  Both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims share the most fundamental Islamic 
beliefs and articles of faith.  The differences between them initially stemmed not 
from spiritual differences, but over leadership: who was to lead the Muslim nation 
after the death of the Prophet? 
Sunni Muslims maintained that their post-Prophet leader should come from 
among those capable of the job and selected Muhammad’s close friend and 
advisor, Abu Bakr, as the first Caliph of the Islamic nation.  The word “Sunni” in 
Arabic means “one who follows the traditions of the Prophet.”14 
However, the Shi’a held that post-Prophet leadership belonged within the 
Prophet’s own family, among those specifically appointed by him, or among 
Imams appointed by God Himself.  The Shi’a Muslims contended that leadership 
should have passed to Muhammad’s cousin/son-in-law, Ali, and to the descendants 
of Ali.  The term Shi’a or Shi’ite derives from a shortening of Shiat Ali or partisans 
of Ali.15 
 
decree of King Fahd , Mar. 1992 Royal Order No.A/90,  of 1 Mar. 1992, to promulgate the 
Constitution. 
 12. THE BASIC LAW OF THE SULTANATE OF OMAN [Constitution] art. 2 (Oman), Royal Sultani 
Decree No. 101/96 
 13. Khoury, supra note 1, at 201. 
 14. Hussein Abdulwaheed Amin, The Origins of the Sunni/Shia Split in Islam, available at 
www.islamfortoday.com/shia.htm. 
 15. Id. 
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1.  Arbitration of Old 
It is tempting, given the ubiquitous coverage given to the Middle East’s oil 
interests, to fail to acknowledge that the Islamic Muslim world has a centuries’ 
long commercial history.  In fact, one commenter Linda Lim, submits that Islam 
has always been a religion of trade and of world traders and that the Prophet’s wife 
was herself a trader whose earnings permitted Muhammad to conduct his 
proselytizing efforts.16 
In the Pre-Islamic Arab community, self-help tended to be the most relied upon 
method of dispute resolution.17  If the parties, through negotiations, failed to 
resolve their differences over matters such as property, succession, or torts, an 
hakam18 (an arbitrator) was appointed.  An hakam could be any male possessing 
high personal qualities who enjoyed a favorable reputation in the community and 
whose family was noted for their competence in dispute settlement.19 
If the hakam agreed to arbitrate, the parties then put up a meaningful form of 
security (property or hostages) to ensure their compliance with the hakam’s 
decision.20 
The decision of the hakam was final but not enforceable (hence, the reason for 
the security) — it was an authoritative statement as to what the customary law was 
or should be.  In fact, Schacht refers to a hakam in such situations as “a lawmaker, 
an authoritative expounder of the normative legal custom or sunna.”21  Schacht 
continues, “[t]he arbitrators applied and at the same time developed the sunna; it 
was the sunna with the force of public opinion behind it, which had in the first 
place insisted on the procedure of negotiation and arbitration.”22 
Arbitration continued as a dispute resolution practice in the Muhammad and 
post-Muhammad eras, as well.  In fact, for a Muslim, arbitration carries with it no 
better imprimatur23 than that given to it by the Prophet himself. 
There are, in the literature, a number of examples of Muhammad taking on the 
 
 16. Linda Lim, Terrorism and Globalization: An International Perspective, 35 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 703, 704 (2002). 
 17. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 7 (1964). 
 18. In some texts the term qadi is used to signify an arbitrator.  Both Schacht and Salah seem to 
agree that a qadi is more akin to a judge (a public official), whereas the hakam is a private 
arbitrator. 
 19. SCHACHT, supra note 17, at 7. 
 20. Id. at 8. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. If one will permit a bit of mixed religious usage. 
PP 169-193 GEMMELL (AA) 12/9/2006  4:12 PM 
5 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2006) 
  
174 
role of a hakam before and after his Prophethood.24  Two notable examples are 
those provided by Abu-Nimer, who writes of an instance when the Prophet was 
involved in a dispute between himself and the Banu Qurayza (a Jewish tribe).  The 
Prophet, notwithstanding his prominence, agreed with the Jewish people to submit 
their dispute to a third party chosen by them.25  Abu-Nimer also writes of the 
Prophet’s selection by the disputants to arbitrate a conflict between Arab and 
Jewish tribes.26  These and other examples of the Prophet’s commitment and 
participation in the arbitral process caused Majeed to refer to Muhammad as an 
“exemplary standard for the independence of arbitrators.”27 
Schacht concurs, writing that Muhammad’s commitment to the arbitral process 
was such that, not only did Muhammad attach great importance to being appointed 
by the believers as a hakam, but his subsequent authority as a political and military 
leader resulted in Muhammad becoming a “Prophet-Lawgiver.” 28 
Besides the Prophet’s participation and support, additional validation of 
arbitration is found in the Koran.  Two often cited examples are: 
And if you fear a breach between the two, then appoint a judge from his people and a 
judge from her people; if they both desire agreement, Allah will effect harmony between 
them; surely Allah is knowing, Aware.29 
[Y]ou should always refer disputes to God and to His Prophet. And obey Allah and His 
Messenger; And fall into no disputes, lest you lose heart And your power to depart; and be 
patient and persevering: for Allah is with those who patiently persevere.30 
In light of Muhammad’s and the Koran’s explicit blessings for the arbitral 
process, one might have expected that a smooth and orderly transition into the 
modern workings of arbitration would have occurred, however, it did not.   Beside 
the Sunni-Shi’a division, there are within the Sunni branch of Islam four schools of 
Shariah interpretation and, each School varies its doctrinal approach to the 
resolution of disputes.31 Thus, this article must focus, briefly, on the approach of 
 
 24. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam, 15 J. 
L. & RELIGION 217, n. 62. (2000-2001). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Nudrat Majeed, Investor-State Disputes and International Law: From the Far Side, 98 AM. 
SOC’Y. INT’L L. PROC. 30, 32 (2004). 
 28. Schacht, supra note 17, at 10-11. 
 29. Koranic verse (4:35) cited by David Karl, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign 
Attorneys Should Know, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 131, fn. 286 (1992) (quoted 
by Sarvenaz Bahar, Khomeinism, The Islamic Republic of Iran, and International Law: The 
Relevance of Islamic Political Ideology, 33 HARV. INT’L L. J. 145, fn. (1992)). 
 30. Koranic verse (8:46) quoted by Abu-Nimer, supra note 24 at 245. 
 31. Saleh, supra note 9, at 4-6. 
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each Sunni School so that a full exposition to commercial arbitration in the Middle 
East can be made. 
i)  The Hanafi School 
Hanafi scholars emphasize that the contractual nature of arbitration32 and 
arbitral awards are characterized by the use of subjective opinions.33  The Hanafi 
School stresses the close connection between arbitration and conciliation.  Thus, to 
the Hanafis, an arbitral award more closely approximates conciliation than a court 
judgment, and, consequently, is of lesser force than a court judgment.34 
New problems are examined and anticipated through the use of analogy (qiyas). 
Reason and equitable principles are used.35  A disputing party is obligated to abide 
by the arbitral award because the agreement to resort to arbitration binds the 
parties like any other contract.36 
ii)  The Maliki School 
The Maliki School relies on the use of the Ijma of the Medina legal scholars, 
local Medina customs, the Koran, and the Sunna and Qiyas.   For the Malikis, the 
notion of public good is a valid jurisprudential principle.37  The Malikis evidence a 
unique trust in arbitration by permitting one of the disputants to be chosen as an 
arbitrator by the other disputing party.38  Unlike the other three schools, this School 
holds that an arbitrator cannot be removed after the commencement of the 
arbitration proceedings.39 
iii) The Shafi School 
Shafi teaching is eclectic, borrowing from the Hanafis and the Malikis, and 
often appears to be torn between logic and traditional teaching.  Shafis stress the 
importance of both the Koran and the Sunna, but select the Sunna more critically 
than the Malikis.40  There is little use of Qiyas in the arbitral process.41 
 
 32. Zeyad Alqurashi, Arbitration under the Islamic Sharia, Vol.1, Issue 2 Oil, Gas and Energy 
Law Intelligence Mar. 2003 para. 4.1 available at (with password) 
http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/articles/welcome.asp?article_63.htm. 
 33. Saleh,  supra  note 9, at 5. 
 34. Alqurashi, supra note 32. 
 35. Saleh, supra note 9, at 5. 
 36. Alqurashi , supra note 32. 
 37. Saleh, supra note 9, at 5. 
 38. ABDUL HAMID EL-AHDAB, ARBITRATION WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES, 19 (1999). 
 39. Alqurashi,  supra note 32. 
 40. Saleh,  supra note 9, at 5-6. 
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Shafi arbitration is a legal practice; however, the position of arbitrators is 
inferior to that of judges since arbitrators under this School may be removed by the 
parties up to the time of the issuance of the award. 
iv)  The Hanbali School 
The most “conservative” of the four Schools is the Hanbali school.  Hanbali 
teachings are deeply centered on the Koran and uncritically accept the authenticity 
of the Sunna, even those rejected by other schools.42  The Hanbalis make few 
concessions to personal reasoning (ra’y) or equity.43 
According to the Hanbali School, a decision made by an arbitrator has the same 
binding nature as a court’s judgment.  Thus, the award made by an arbitrator (who 
must have the same qualifications as a judge) carries a res judicata effect upon 
both of the parties since it was they who chose him.44 
2.  The Medjella 
Before discussing modern commercial arbitration, one additional piece of 
arbitral historiography is worthy of note: the Medjella.  The Medjella of Legal 
Provisions was the first codification of the Shariah under the Ottoman Empire.45  
A number of Islamic countries relied on the Medjella even after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire, until they developed their own civil law. 
An entire section of the Medjella is devoted to arbitration; however, the form 
arbitration takes was more in line with conciliation and compromise.  Only a court 
judgment gave final authority to the arbitral award.  There was no res judicata 
effect based solely on the award itself.  Nonetheless, the contractual nature of 
arbitration was affirmed and reinforced. 
Arbitration awards that were made by a panel of arbitrators were required to be 
rendered unanimously.  Either party was permitted to dismiss an arbitrator before 
an award was made.  
The parties were expected to adhere to an award rendered, since, it was 
reasoned, the award was derived in the first instance from an agreement by the 
parties.  A court could void an arbitrator’s award if the award was found to be 
contrary to a previously rendered court judgment.  
 
 41. Id. at 6. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Alqurashi, supra  note 32, at para. 4.3. 
 45. This portion of the article comes exclusively from El-Ahdab, supra note 38, at 21-22. 
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An arbitrator’s scope was less than that of a court and was limited only to 
matters before him relating to the dispute.  
Schacht characterized the Medjella as, “. . . an experiment [that] was undertaken 
under the influence of European ideas, and it is, strictly, speaking a secular code 
 . . . not intended for the tribunals of the kadis and was in fact not used by them . . . 
it contains certain modifications of the strict doctrine of Islamic law.”46  Schacht’s 
characterization is consistent with El-Ahdab’s contention that the Medjella 
“remained in force (subject to subsequent legislation) in the territories and later 
states which were detached from the Ottoman Empire after 1918, where it was 
applied as the civil law . . . .”47 
C.  Shaping Modern Day Arbitration 
No serious student of Islamic Middle Eastern commercial arbitration can easily 
skip over the impact that the Libyan, Abu Dhabi, and ARAMCO cases have had on 
the development of Islamic commercial arbitration.  Each of the cases requires 
analysis since they dealt with disputes over oil concessions granted by the 
respective national governments to western oil companies.  
Between 1971 and 1974, the Libyan government nationalized the properties of 
three foreign oil companies.  Each of the nationalizations was publicly touted by 
Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi as Libyan state actions in retaliation for UK and US 
foreign policy positions.48 
Each of the concession agreements contained arbitration clauses.  The 
agreements included choice of law provisions under which Libyan law and 
international law (as relevant) would govern.49 
The outcome of the Libyan arbitrations50 is a tale of three arbitrations: each with 
identical factual backgrounds; each with identical legal documents; and each to be 
resolved in accordance with three identical choice of law clauses.51 
The Libyan government lost all three cases, but what is of note to scholars of 
 
 46. Schacht, supra note 17, at 92-3. 
 47. El-Ahdab,  supra note 38,  at 21. 
 48. Robert von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, International Arbitrations Between States and 
Foreign parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 A.J.I.L 476, 476-90 (1981). 
 49. Id. at 498-99. 
 50. Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. v The Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 389 
(1979); B.P. Exploration Co. v. The Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 297 
(1979); Libyan American Oil Co. v. The Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic 20 ILM 1 
(1981). 
 51. Amr Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the 
Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 448 (2000). 
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international commercial arbitration is that each arbitrator based their decisions on 
a different legal analysis. 
To illustrate, the question of choice of law was a critical procedural issue that 
the arbitrators had to decide in each case.  The arbitrator in the British Petroleum 
case ruled that, absent party agreement, the principle of the lex situs arbitri should 
prevail.  Since the arbitration was to be conducted in Copenhagen, Danish 
procedural law needed to be fixed as the applicable procedural law.52 
In the LIAMCO Arbitration, it was decided that in the absence of an agreement 
by the parties as to which procedural law should govern, the UN Draft Convention 
on Arbitral Procedure needed to apply.53 
In the Texaco case, the arbitrator decided that international procedural law 
needed to apply since international law was utilized to select an arbitrator.  It 
deductively followed, the arbitrator held, that he had been granted broad powers to 
decide the appropriate procedural rules.54 
The inconsistencies continued as the arbitrators struggled with the question: if 
the concession contract was breached by Libya, was restitutio in integrum (what 
we might refer to modernly as equitable restitution) an appropriate remedy in each 
of the disputes? 
Arbitrator Lagergren, in the BP case, seemingly influenced by the principles of 
the Chorzow Factory55 case, held not for restitution, but for damages in full in 
cases of unlawful expropriation.56 
In the Texaco case, Arbitrator Dupuy turned to the principle of Chorzow and 
pacta sunt servanda and ordered, on the basis of equitable restitution, that Libya 
resume performance under the concession agreement.57 
LIAMCO’s Arbitrator Mahmassani was betwixt and between over the issue of 
restitution.  On one hand, he reasoned that restitutio in integrum violated the 
principle of sovereign autonomy within the sovereign’s territory.  On the other 
hand, he was somewhat inclined toward both damnum emergens (actual, not 
prospective loss) and lucrum cessans (prospective loss).  In the end, he held that 
 
 52. Von Mehren, supra note 48, at 505. 
 53. Id. at 507. 
 54. Id. 
 55. The Chorzow Factory case was for some time the seminal “reparations” case which dealt 
with a claim by Germany over the expropriation of a factory.  The case citation is The 
Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 (ser. A) No. 17, available at 
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idecisions/icpij/. 
 56. Partick Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the Int’l 
Law of Expropriation, 85 A.J.I.L 474, 480 (1991). 
 57. Id. at 480-81. 
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lucrum cessans was not available in this case and awarded equitable compensation 
on the basis of lost profits.58 
While the arbitral hermeneutics of these three awards had to be bewildering to 
Middle Eastern arbitral observers, they were baffling and remain so to Western 
scholars.  Looking over the landscape created by these awards, one academic critic 
wrote, “[t]rois arbitrages, un meme problem, trois solutions.”59  It is no wonder 
that the Islamic legal world looked askance at the “logic” and “rationales” used by 
the arbitrators in these cases which, in turn, led to a subsequent, and perhaps 
justifiable, distrust of the “Western” arbitral process. 
At least, the “Libyan” arbitrators did not go as far as the arbitrator in the Abu 
Dhabi arbitration.60 In a similar dispute, also over an oil concession contract, Lord 
Asquith acknowledged that Abu Dhabi law should govern and concluded that the 
Abu Dhabi Sheik was “an absolute, feudal monarch . . . [who] administers a purely 
discretionary justice with the assistance of the Koran; and it would be fanciful to 
suggest that in this very primitive region there is any settled body of legal 
principles applicable to the construction of modern commercial instruments.”  
Asquith held that the terms of the contract “invite, indeed prescribe, the application 
of principles rooted in the good sense and common practice of the generality of 
civilised nations — a sort of ‘modern law of nature.”  Although Lord Asquith 
conceded that “English municipal law [was] inapplicable as such,” he determined 
that “some of its rules are . . . so firmly grounded in reason, as to form part of this 
broad body of jurisprudence” and, indeed, are “principle[s] of ecumenical validity” 
and “mere common sense.”61 
Similar to the Libyan cases, the arbitrator in the ARAMCO case62 decided that 
ARAMCO’s rights would be unable to be “secured in an unquestionable manner 
by the law of force in Saudi Arabia . . . [and that Saudi laws] must be interpreted or 
supplemented by the general principles of law, by the custom and practice in the 
oil business and by notions of pure jurisprudence.”63 
In these cases, the arbitrators concocted a unique arbitral stew consisting of one 
part cynicism for local law and one part disdain for the Islamic parties’ ability to 
 
 58. Id. at 481. 
 59. Brigitte Stern, Revue de L'Arbitrage 1, 3 (1980) (citing Abul Maniruzzaman, The Lex 
Mercatoria and Int’l Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration, 14 
AM. U. INT’L REV. 657, 719 ( 1999)). 
 60. Petroleum Dev. (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v Sheik of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144 (1951). 
 61. C. Brower & J. Sharpe, International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase, 
97 AMJIL 643, 644 (2003). 
 62. Saudi Arabia v Arabian Am. Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117 (1958). 
 63. Brower & Sharpe, supra note 61, at n.16. 
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enforce rights.  They added equity and lex mercatoria, and further contributed 
some allusions to jus cogens and jus gentium.  The profound and lasting impact of 
these arbitrations on the region’s arbitral psyche should not be underestimated.  It 
is no wonder that “Western” forms of commercial arbitration have, to this day, not 
been an integral to the Islamic legal system. 
PART II 
A.  Arbitration Agreements and Arbitration Clauses 
This article will now examine the various components of contemporary Islamic 
Middle Eastern commercial arbitration. 
The Main Elements of a Shariah - based arbitration are:64 an extant dispute, an 
agreement by the parties to submit their dispute to an arbitrator — who, though not 
a qadi, must possess qadi-like qualities, acceptance by the parties of the arbitrator, 
and determination of the dispute according to Islamic law.  The Hanafis stress the 
contractual nature of arbitration agreement; the Malikis insist on the arbitrator’s 
neutrality; the Hanbalis stress the qualifications of the arbitrator; and the Shafis 
tend to view arbitration thematically.  All schools view the arbitration contract as 
valid (though not binding for the Hanafis).65 
What may be arbitrated66 varies by school.  While the Hanafi school permits 
more cases to go to arbitration than do the other schools, the Hanafis prohibit 
arbitration in cases involving Hadd (fixed punishments which are publicly 
administered) and qisas (retaliation).  The Medjella took a broad view of 
arbitration authorizing arbitration in virtually any financial matter involving 
private rights.  Malikis and Shafis allow arbitration in all financial and 
compensation cases but forbid arbitrations for Hadd and family law.  Hanbalis take 
a wide view as to subject matter may be arbitrated, but preclude arbitration for 
certain Hadd offenses. 
Islamic Middle Eastern Arbitration Clauses Fall Into Two Categories:67  First 
there are valid arbitration clauses, which are those necessary to the contract, 
appropriate to the contract and commonly used in commercial transactions.  
Secondly, invalid arbitration clauses are those that contain any of the following 
provisions: the payment of riba (usury/interest/unearned advantage); that include 
 
 64. SALEH, supra note 9, at 21. 
 65. Id. at 22. 
 66. See generally id. at 47-48. 
 67. EL-AHDAB, supra note 38, at 26-27. 
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shurut (extraneous conditions); and that contain gharar (uncertainty or are 
executory).  The Shariah prohibits agreements to arbitrate future disputes or 
disputes not yet formulated.68  If included, the contract is void ab initio. 
Nevertheless arbitration does take place in the Islamic Middle East.  How is this 
accomplished? Is it through sophistry or pragmatism?  It appears that most of the 
literature comes down on the side of pragmatism, “[i]n practice . . . Muslim 
individuals and their governments routinely charge and pay interest on loans, and 
conclude and enforce contracts of insurance because it is impossible to have a 
viable economic system today without these practices.”69 
More directly, Ballantyne, writing of commercial law in general of and riba in 
particular, suggests, “[t]o generalize again, this has been done by preserving Sharia 
principles but abandoning them in commercial codes . . . .  This is, of course, is not 
compromise . . . but evasion.”70 
So be it through pragmatism, evasion, or the principle that “agreements must be 
observed,” arbitration agreements are, in fact, sprinkled with “Western” style 
provisions in a number of parts of the Islamic Middle East.   
In recent years, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Oman joined Lebanon and 
Djibouti in the enactment of international arbitration laws.71  Generally modeled on 
the UNCITRAL72 model, these states have also put in their own unique 
requirements to the arbitral mix.  Nonetheless, the statutes exist and, being based 
on UNCITRAL, the drafters of national arbitral legislation attempted to define 
arbitration agreements and arbitration clauses as commercial matters rather than 
exclusively religious matters. 
Two examples are noteworthy.  First, Egypt crafted a new arbitration act in 
199473 that widened the scope of arbitration to, as El-Ahdab puts it, “. . . any legal 
dispute whatever be the legal nature of the relationship which is the subject matter 
of the dispute.”74 
 
 68. William Ballantyne, The Challenge of Islamic Commercial Law in the Middle East, in 
ARAB COMMERCIAL LAW,  17 (William Ballantyne and Howard L. Stovall eds., 2002). 
 69. Abdullah An-Na’im, Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate, 94 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 95, 98 (2000). 
 70. Ballantyne, ARAB COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 68, at 20. 
 71. Fathi Kemicha, Arbitration in the Arab World in the Twenty-First Century in ARAB 
COMMERCIAL LAW,  supra note 68, at 153. 
 72. UNCITRAL is the acronym for the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law whose charter includes the development of model laws applicable to private parties in 
international transactions and disputes.  Model rule for arbitration, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html. 
 73. Egyptian Arbitration Law no. 27/94 . 
 74. El-Ahdab, supra note 38, at 168. 
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Secondly, Oman closely followed Egypt’s lead and, based also on the 
UNCITRAL model, enacted a new arbitration act75 far more secular in nature than 
had previously existed.76 
B.  Applicable or Choice of Law 
As is found throughout the Islamic Middle East, two approaches to the choice of 
law are applied when disputants are faced with arbitration: whether the state adheres to 
the Shariah requirements of arbitration; or, whether a state has bifurcated its religious 
and secular civil codes. 
For at least the Hanafi and Maliki schools, the procedural and substantive rules 
of the Shariah apply.77  In fact, for the Malikis, application of Maliki doctrine is 
mandatory when Malikis are the parties to arbitration.78  Shafi and Hanbali have 
little teaching on the issue of choice of law or applicable law.79 
Saleh relates an interesting approach taken by the Hanafis to circumvent the 
substantive and procedural requirements of the Shariah.  Article 1850 of the 
Medjella permits two arbitrators, one chosen by each side, to act as amiable 
compositeurs who attempt to reach a conciliative solution.  If such a solution is 
consummated, then these solutions are not subject to judicial review and are 
irrevocable under Article 1156 of the Medjella.80 
As Sunni Hanafi countries, Jordan’s and Kuwait’s laws reflect a bifurcated 
approach between their religious and civil approaches to commercial arbitration.  
Jordan’s civil code is primarily based on Ottoman law with its arbitration act81 
heavily influenced by English arbitration laws.82  Kuwaiti law was also Ottoman-
based, but subsequent to its independence was influenced by Egyptian jurists. 83 
Both the Kuwaiti and the Jordanian arbitration acts require arbitrator(s) to apply 
that law which has been chosen by the parties.84  In fact, their arbitration acts 
mirror the approach taken by many countries throughout the world, i.e. the 
disjunction between the place of arbitration and the law applied. 
Yemen, a country similar to Jordan and Kuwait religiously, is predominately 
 
 75. Sultani Decree No. 48/97, the Law of Arbitration of Civil and Commercial Disputes. 
 76. EL-AHDAB, supra note 38, at 478-79. 
 77. SALEH, supra note 9, at 55. 
 78. Id. at 56. 
 79. Id. at 57. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Act No. 13/62 — Official Gazette dated 1 Mar., 62 No. 1603. 
 82. EL-AHDAB, supra note 38, at 239 (Jordan). 
 83. Id. at 289-90 (Kuwait). 
 84. Id. at 275 (Jordan) and at 307 (Kuwait). 
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Shi’a Zayidi with a substantial Sunni Shafi population.  Yet it too has enacted a 
“progressive” arbitration act,85 permitting arbitrators to use Yemeni law or another 
international law depending on the law to which the parties have agreed.86 
This Yemeni modernity is rather surprising in a country reputed to be one of the 
more conservative Islamic states.  The ability to mix the proverbial old with the 
new was illustrated in the Yemeni Minister of Justice’s comments when, along 
with a series of other statutes, the arbitration act was promulgated.  The Minister 
called Yemen’s efforts, “an avant-garde experience [that] cast the provisions of the 
Shariah in a modern mould . . . and taking the doctrinal treasure of the “Fiqh” . . . 
[created] a model of codification and the nucleus of a unified Moslem legislation 
which can be applied throughout the entire Moslem world.”87 
C.  The Selection of Arbitrators 
When dissecting national laws that deal with the naming of arbitrators, one typically 
looks at three elements: 1) how the arbitrator is selected; 2) whether or not there a fixed 
number of arbitrators required; and 3) the process by which an arbitrator can be 
dismissed, if at all. 
As for the selection process, a number of Islamic Middle Eastern states permit 
the parties to choose the arbitrator (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, and Syria).88  Morocco permits party autonomy in the selection of 
arbitrators for commercial, but not for civil matters.89  Saudi Arabia provides the 
parties with a list of arbitrators.  The use of the list is encouraged but not 
required.90 
None of the four Islamic legal schools specify the number of arbitrators 
required for an arbitration, that decision is left to the parties.91  Arbitrators, 
needless to say, should be dismissed only under unusual circumstances.  A top line 
review of various Middle Eastern states reveals that Jordan permits dismissal of an 
arbitrator due to misconduct or for having exceeded the scope of his charter, 
Algeria, Bahrain, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Libya permit dismissal by 
agreement of the parties, and Syria and Kuwait, in addition to removal by consent 
 
 85. Act N° 33/1981 (Official Gazette  N° 12 of 31 Dec. 1981). 
 86. El-Ahdab, supra note 38, at 763. 
 87. Id. at 742. 
 88. Id. at 87-9 (Algeria), at 107 (Bahrain), at 173-74 (Egypt), at 247-8 (Jordan), at 299-300 
(Kuwait), at 343-45 (Lebanon), at 429-30 (Libya), at 658 (Syria). 
 89. Id. at 457-59. 
 90. Id at 577. 
 91. Alqurashi, supra note 32, at para. 5.2. 
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of the parties, permit the dismissal of an arbitrator if he is found to have a 
relationship with either party.  Egypt permits dismissal for unforeseen impartiality 
or independence on the part of the arbitrator.  Libya also permits dismissal through 
a court order.92 
1.  How do Arbitrators Accept Their Arbitral Responsibilities? 
The methods by which arbitrators accept their responsibilities vary by country.  
Bahrain93 requires that an arbitrator signifies his acceptance in writing, whereas, in 
Morocco94 it can be deduced from the arbitrator’s commencement of the arbitral 
proceedings that he has accepted his charge.  Similarly, in Lebanon, 
notwithstanding the country’s civil code requirement that an arbitrator’s 
acceptance be in writing, a Lebanese court held that an arbitrator’s signature on his 
award was sufficient evidence of his acceptance.95  Libya accepts an arbitrator’s 
signature on the agreement to arbitrate as evidence of acceptance.96  Jordan’s law 
does not require that the arbitrator accept his appointment in writing, only that the 
appointment be made through a writing.97 
D.  The Arbitration Award 
Under Shariah principles, an arbitration award must be signed by the arbitrator 
and witnessed by two people.  The award should be divided into four parts: a 
description of the dispute; the finding of facts under Shariah rules of evidence; the 
reasoning of the award with reference to Shariah sources; and the decision itself.98 
Only a minority of Shafi scholars dissent from the generally accepted view that 
arbitral awards have the same res judicata effect as a judgment made by a qadi.  
Maliki and Hanbali commentators consider an arbitration award as binding and 
enforceable as an ordinary court judgment.  Most Hanafi scholars and the Medjella 
require no affirmation of an arbitration award by a qadi.99 
It seems somewhat counterintuitive that, under Shariah principles, an arbitration 
award is binding, whereas the agreement to arbitrate is revocable.  The revocable 
 
 92. EL-AHDAB, supra note 38, at 249 (Jordan), at 68 (Algeria), at 108 (Bahrain), at 458 
(Morocco), at 583 (Saudi Arabia), at 430 (Libya), at 659 (Syria), at 300-01 (Kuwait), at 430 
(Libya). 
 93. Id. at 108. 
 94. Id. at 457. 
 95. Id. at 348-49. 
 96. Id. at 430. 
 97. Id. at 249. 
 98. SALEH, supra note 9, at 74. 
 99. Id. at 75. 
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becomes irrevocable at award. 
In consonance with the above, Egypt, which is predominately Shafi, requires 
that awards be in writing, contain the arbitrator’s reasoning for his decision, the 
award be dated and signed, and has res judicata effect as of the date the award is 
signed.  The award, however, must be registered with the court of jurisdiction.100 
In predominately Hanafi Jordan, an arbitration award does not have res judicata 
effect until approved by the Jordanian courts.101 
Shi’a Zaydi Yemen law speaks to the res judicata effect of an arbitration award, 
but a Yemeni award is not enforceable until the requisite time for appeal to set 
aside an award has expired.102 
In a rather consistent pattern, arbitration laws in Islamic Middle Eastern 
countries speak to the res judicata effect of an arbitration award, yet, court 
registration or court supervision is maintained.  This is the case in Bahrain (court 
registration and supervision), as well as in Kuwait, Oman, and Syria (res judicata 
as of the date signed but subject to court registration).103  In Morocco, an 
arbitration award has the same legal status as a notarized deed and its leave to 
enforce is granted only by a court. 104  In Saudi Arabia, an arbitration award has res 
judicata effect, but only when validated by a court judgment.105 
An arbitrator does not necessarily bring finality to a dispute between parties. 
Sufficient room is left, procedurally, for either expeditious judicial management or 
judicial meddling, procrastination, and delay. 
1.  Time Limits for an Award 
While one of the perceived advantages of commercial arbitration is the speed of 
the arbitration process, Turck finds fault with the requirements of some Middle 
Eastern states, suggesting that by attempting to accelerate the process, the end 
result may be an inefficient arbitral process and undesirable consequences.106  She 
exemplifies this by pointing out that Libya and Syria require an award to be issued 
with three months of the arbitrator’s date of acceptance.  In Libya, a one-time three 
month extension is granted, beyond that the arbitration starts anew.  In Syria, if no 
 
 100. EL-AHDAB,  supra note 38, at 186-89. 
 101. Id. at 282. 
 102. Id. at 765. 
 103. Id. at 112-13 (Bahrain), at 308-09 (Kuwait), at 499-500 (Oman), at 667-68 (Syria). 
 104. Id. at 464-65. 
 105. Id. at 602-03. 
 106. Nancy Turck, Trends in Middle East Arbitration Laws and Practices, in ARAB COMERCIAL 
LAW, supra note 68, at 136. 
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award is made within three months, the parties start anew.107  Certainly, the parties 
should expect that an award be made in a timely fashion, but not to the extent that 
these two countries mandate. 
2.  Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards 
The document most credited with the enforcement of international arbitral 
awards is the New York Convention. 108  Writing that the New York Convention 
“stands as a landmark between the ancient world and the new one,” Di Pietro and 
Platte proclaim, “[t]hanks to the New York Convention arbitration has overcome 
the uncertainty of the past . . . .”109 
Adopted in 1958 and entered into force in 1959, the New York Convention 
requires courts of each contracting state to “apply . . . the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State 
where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out 
of differences between persons, whether physical or legal.”  And “also apply to 
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their 
recognition and enforcement are sought.”110  There have been over 130 countries 
that have ratified the Convention, including all the major trading powers of the 
world.111 
The Convention permits states to subscribe to the Convention with two 
reservations:  “any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply 
the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the 
territory of another Contracting State.  It may also declare that it will apply the 
Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether 
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of 
the State making such declaration.”112 
The reciprocity reservation permitted under the Convention has been 
instrumental in permitting states to ratify the Convention, knowing full well that 
 
 107. Id. at 136-7. 
 108. The convention is formally known as United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 1958), available at  
 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html 
[hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 109. DOMENICO DI PIETRO & MARTIN PLATTE, ENFORCEMENT OF INT’L ARBITRATION 
AWARDS, 13 (2001). 
 110. The New York Convention, supra note 108, at art. 1, ¶ 1. 
 111. Gloria Miccioli, A Selective Guide to Online Int’l Arbitration Resources, June 21, 2004, 
http://www.llrx.com/features/intarbitration.htm (emphasis added). 
 112. New York Convention, supra note 108, at art. 1, § 3. 
PP 169-193 GEMMELL (AA) 12/9/2006  4:12 PM 
 Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East 187 
  
187
the Convention will be applicable only to states that recognize each other’s foreign 
judgments.  In addition, the commercial reservation assures subscribing states that 
matters strictly domestic, such as family or inheritance law, will not be subject to 
the Convention.  This is especially important to Middle Eastern Islamic states, 
where such matters are reserved exclusively to domestic jurisdiction. 
Under the New York Convention, there are grounds available to a resisting 
party for refusal to recognize and enforce an award.  They are: incapacity of the 
parties to perform; lack of due process, specifically, notice; invalidity of the 
arbitration agreement; faulty composition of the arbitration tribunal and/or the 
existence of faulty arbitration procedure; and the arbitration award was not yet 
“binding” on the parties or had been set aside at the place of arbitration.113 
These exceptions to enforcement are broad legal terms subject to interpretive 
differences.  Their breadth is understandable given the intent of the drafters of the 
Convention to appeal to as many states as possible.  However, the subsequent and 
inevitable legal parsing made to each exception requires that practitioners of 
international commercial arbitration fully contemplate how the enforcement 
sections within their arbitration agreements are drafted.  Nonetheless, the New 
York Convention is brief and written with a great deal of clarity.  Arguably, it is 
the most important means for enforcement of foreign arbitration awards.114 
The Convention provides a simple and effective way to obtain recognition and 
enforcement of both arbitration agreements and arbitration awards, since Article V 
of the Convention limits the grounds for judicial review.  “It is mainly due to the 
provisions of the New York Convention that arbitration has become a very 
attractive alternative to traditional litigation.”115  How then does the New York 
Convention and its enforcement mechanism play out in the Islamic Middle East for 
those nations that are subscribing states and for those who are not?   
As of July, 2005, the following relevant states had become signatories to the 
New York Convention: Egypt, Syria, Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Bahrain, Algeria, Brunei, Lebanon, Oman, Iran, and 
Qatar.116  But as we shall see, the fact that these states have signed the Convention 
does not mean all is well with the enforcement of foreign awards. 
As previously done, the Shariah is analyzed first. 
 
 113. Id. at art. 5, ¶ 1. 
 114. Laure Leservoisier, Enforcing Arbitration Awards and Important Conventions in the 
Arbitration Process, in THE ARBITRATION PROCESS: COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 255, 256 (D. Campbell ed., 2002). 
 115. DI PIETRO, supra note 109, at 17. 
 116. Convention signatories available at www.nortonrose.com/html_pubs/view.asp?id=4777. 
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El-Ahdab, quite succinctly, states that under Shariah law, non-Muslims are free 
to contract and enter business relationships.  The judgments and awards arising out 
of their business relationships are free from the proscriptions and authorizations of 
Muslim law.117  However, once a Muslim becomes party to a contract, cognizance 
of  Shariah principles is necessary.118 
As was earlier illustrated, international lawyers must take care when drafting 
foreign award enforcement provisions.  If a Muslim and a non-Muslim  contract 
with each other under principles other than Shariah, then a Muslim court may 
invoke the “public order” provision of the New York Convention and refuse to 
enforce the foreign award.119  El-Ahdab agrees with this conclusion and using 
Saudi Arabia as an example, points out that any award made abroad or using 
foreign law is subject to the public order reservation if the award is deemed 
contrary to the Shariah. 120 
Although a number of Middle Eastern states have become signatories to the 
New York Convention, there exists something of a duality between form and 
substance.  Mallet writes that since the ARAMCO decision, the Saudi position, 
“may be extreme, legislation tends to create all kinds of typically procedural 
problems to arbitration.  This is done either for special contracts of some 
commercial significance, like those related to agency and distribution, or in a more 
general manner.”121  Mallet explains, “[w]hether rejected openly by legislation or 
hampered by administrative means, the uselessness in Lebanon of an arbitration 
clause . . . is true of Bahrain, of the UAE, of Kuwait, of Jordan, and Oman.  The 
list is not comprehensive.”122 
This pervasive attitude carries over into enforcement, as well.  Again, Mallet 
states, “there is a long string of statutes allowing setting aside arbitration awards 
granted internationally, by freezing them, subjecting them to various appeals, or 
simply ignoring them.”123 
As evidence, Mallet cites various legislative decrees in Algeria, the UAE, and 
Kuwait.  He also quotes an unnamed but “well known” English barrister who 
 
 117. EL-AHDAB, supra note 38, at 50-51. 
 118. Id. at 51. 
 119. New York Convention, supra note 108, at Article V, §2(b) gives a national court the 
authority to refuse to recognize an award on the grounds that the subject matter is not 
arbitrable in the "enforcement" state or that an arbitration award is contrary to public policy. 
 120. EL-AHDAB, supra note 38, at 601. 
 121. Chibli Mallat, A Comparative Critique of the Arbitration process in the Arab World, 1(3) 
LEBANESE REVIEW OF ARAB ARBITRATION 1, 5-7 (1996), available at 
http://www.mallat.com/articles/arbitration.htm. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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spoke of Oman, saying that “since the commercial judicature was constituted in its 
current form, more that ten years ago, there has been no case where direct 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award has been granted.”124 
Lest one think that Mallet is particularly hard on Islamic Middle Eastern 
enforcement mechanisms, or the lack thereof, Akaddaf chimes in, “[a]lso, although 
Saudi Arabia ratified the New York Convention . . . , the Saudi legal system does 
not recognize or enforce agreements of foreign jurisdictions.”125  Akaddaf goes on 
to point out that Iran only recognizes foreign awards conditionally, the former Iraq 
not at all, Syria will enforce a foreign award only with an exequatur, and Egypt 
will enforce a foreign award if the foreign award does not go against public policy 
or morals.126 
Roy is more optimistic about those states that have acceded to the New York 
Convention.  She points to Kuwait and Syria, writing that, “[i]n fact, Kuwaiti 
enforcement of international arbitration awards was routine prior to its adoption of 
the New York Convention.”127  To bolster her contention, Roy cites a Kuwaiti 
court’s enforcement of a one million dollar English arbitration award against a 
Kuwaiti national in favor of Merrill Lynch.128 
As for Syria, she writes, “Syria, therefore, enforces all non-Syrian arbitral 
awards, whether or not the award was made by a New York Convention signatory.  
The New York Convention prevails over traditional Syrian law in all cases of non-
Syrian arbitral award enforcement.”129 
As for Saudi Arabia, Roy is more in tune with the above writers:  “[a]s Saudi 
Arabian law and policy is diametrically opposed to the rules and laws of many 
member nations, Saudi Arabian courts may find it easy to reject non-domestic 
arbitral awards pursuant to New York Convention Article V(2)(b).130  In essence, 
Saudi Arabia may not be required to enforce any more non-domestic arbitral 
awards than it did prior to its 1994 accession to the New York Convention.”131   
In addition to the New York Convention, two regional Conventions have been 
adopted for the enforcement of judicial and arbitral decisions within the region: 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Akaddaf,  supra note 7, at 24 
 126. Id. 
 127. Kristin Roy, The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia:  Can a Country Use the Public 
Policy to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitration Awards, 18 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 920, 936 (1995). 
 128. Id. at 937. 
 129. Id. at 938. 
 130. This is the public order exception of the Convention. 
 131. Roy, supra note 127, at 954. 
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The Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation (1983) and The Amman Arab 
Convention on Commercial Arbitration (1987).   
The Riyadh Convention is rarely used for international commercial arbitration.  
In fact, there is but one section (Article 37) of the Riyadh Convention that deals 
with arbitration.132  The remainder of the Convention deals with judicial 
cooperation.  With exceptions, member states are required to recognize and 
enforce judicial awards rendered by other member states without looking to the 
merits of the case.133 
As for arbitration, the Convention precludes the recognition and enforcement of 
disputes against the government of a contracting state even, presumably, when the 
state is acting de jure gestionis.134  The Convention permits the invocation of 
Shariah law against fellow signatory states.  Hence, if a contracting state’s 
arbitration award is deemed to be antithetical to Shariah dictates, that award need 
not be recognized by the “enforcing” court.135  Recognition of an arbitration award 
by the court of the enforcing country requires the presentment of an exequatur 
from the court of the country where the award was made.136  (The New York 
Convention has long since done away with the exequatur requirement.) 
In April, 1987, thirteen Arab Ministers of Justice created the Amman 
Convention, which was to come into being once acceded to by at least seven states.  
The Convention went into effect in 1992 when eight states ratified the Convention.  
Since 1992, however, no other state represented at the creation of the Convention 
has ratified it.137 
The Riyadh Convention applies to commercial disputes between any natural or 
juristic person, regardless of nationality, that is connected by means of commerce 
with any contracting government.  Its provisions recognize the right of parties to 
agree to commercial arbitration through the placement of such clauses in contracts 
or after a dispute has arisen, and the courts of each member country must enforce 
any award unless “contrary to public order.”138 
Within the Riyadh Convention is the promise of the establishment of an 
 
 132. Id. at 788. 
 133. General Counsel’s Office of the US Department of Commerce, Overview of Commercial 
Law in Iraq, Sept. 12, 2003, available at 
http://www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/iraq_commercial_law_current.pdf [hereinafter Overview of 
Commercial Law in Iraq]. 
 134. EL-AHDAB, supra note 38, at 791. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 793. 
 137. Jordanian Law and Arbitration Center, Arbitration Under the 1987 Amman Convention 
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 138. Overview of Commercial Law in Iraq, supra note 133. 
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arbitration center in Rabat, Morocco.  The Center has not yet become operative.139  
No commercial dispute has yet been settled nor even referred to Rabat since the 
Convention went into effect in 1992.140 
There may be a bright spot. Rather than relying on a regional Convention, 
Bahrain developed its own regional arbitral center in 1993 in Manama. Of Bahrain 
as an arbitral center, Martin is rather encouraged, citing Bahrain’s “relatively pro-
ADR history . . . [since] Bahrain first set up arbitral tribunals in the 1930s to 
resolve commercial disputes.”141 
Carbonneau concurs, maintaining that Bahrain is, “the Arab state that appears to 
be most adapted to the Western view of international commercial arbitration.”142  
He points out that Bahrain adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law; utilizes the 
Bahrain Centre for International Commercial Arbitration; and is a signatory to the 
New York Convention.143 
There is, however, one troubling matter.  Bahrain’s accession to the New York 
Convention included the two standard reservations most countries adopt: 
reciprocity and public order. However, in its implementing legislation,144 Bahrain 
maintained that it would execute New York Convention awards “as far as 
possible.”145  The legal question is, of course: what does that mean?  In less than a 
glowing endorsement, the US Commerce Department advises business people that 
Bahrain’s enforcement of foreign arbitration awards is “less problematic here than 
in most other GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states.”146 
Dubai, likewise, has attempted to lure commercial arbitration to its International 
Arbitration Center which opened in 1994.147  Bahrain and Dubai should be lauded 
for their attempts to broaden the umbrella under which international arbitration 
 
 139. The convention is in French as Convention Arabe D'Amman Sur L'Arbitrage Commercial 
(1987), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/arab.l arbitrage.commercial.convention.1987. 
 140. Overview of Commercial Law in Iraq, supra note 133. 
 141. Julia Martin, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather than Litigating in Los Angeles: The Advantages 
of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 917, n. 361(1997). 
 142. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773, 
795 (2002). 
 143. Id. 
 144. The Accession by the State of Bahrain to the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (June 4, 1988). 
 145. Id. The legislation also provided that Bahrain’s accession did not constitute recognition of 
Israel. 
 146. US Dept. of Commerce, Investment Climate, 
 http://arabchamber.com/arab-countries/bahrain/G/investment_climate.htm,  
 (last visited Nov. 23, 2006). 
 147. Int’l Arbitration Center,  http://www.freezonesuae.com/international_arbitration_center.htm 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2006). 
PP 169-193 GEMMELL (AA) 12/9/2006  4:12 PM 
5 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2006) 
  
192 
will be conducted in their respective countries.  But, until they earn a reputation in 
the international commercial world as a quality venue for enforcement, their short 
term utility is likely to be for domestic commercial arbitration only. 
Conclusion 
It is anomalous that modern commercial arbitration in the Islamic Middle East 
stands in stark contrast to the endorsements given to arbitration by both the 
Prophet and the Shariah.  If blessed by the Prophet and by the Shariah, the 
vigorous utilization and enforcement of international commercial arbitration does 
not represent apostasy; rather the practice appears to be doctrinally inconsistent 
with religious principles. 
The Koran, it appears, provides no rules regarding arbitration, rather it seems to 
provide guidance and direction toward the use of arbitration.  Where Koranic 
doctrine is explicit, religious tolerance must let the Shariah rule for the believer.  
However, if there is a doctrinal void or doctrinal gap as to the use of commercial 
arbitration, the use of international private law to fill the void or fill in the lacunae 
should be considered by Middle Eastern commercial lawmakers.  For example, 
Kuwait is considering the bifurcation of domestic civil law and international 
private law. 
While the traditions of the past provide comfort to believers, it is imperative to 
be cognizant of the present state of the world.  In an ever-shrinking commercial 
world, religious-civil bifurcation would be an attractive starting point to provide 
comfort to the commercial business world that there was legal determinacy in the 
Islamic Middle Eastern arbitral process. 
There should be no expectation that national arbitration statutes and regional 
conventions be uniform or identical.  After all, this article addresses the arbitral 
practices and difference of a number of states.  However, Mallet’s contentions 
should raise the eyebrows of foreign and Middle Eastern corporations.  Deleterious 
procedural tactics in order to delay, prolong, or ignore the implementation of 
foreign arbitration awards is unacceptable in today’s commercial world.  It is in the 
best interests of all parties, that such practices be stopped in order to allow a more 
efficient regional and global economy. 
No experienced businessperson would suggest that international arbitration is 
essential to dispute resolution.  Commercial arbitration is, however, a well-
recognized and vibrant method for international dispute resolution, as evidenced 
by the number of signatories to the New York Convention. 
Fairness demands that there be an attestation to the respectable progress that has 
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taken place in the Islamic Middle East regarding commercial arbitration.  Again, 
not ascribing cure-all qualities to commercial arbitration, sound, cogent, workable 
commercial arbitration laws can reach beyond the legalities of dispute resolution.  
Such laws can represent an important factor in the international commercial 
relations between states.  It takes little business acumen to ascertain whether an 
investor will put money into a country or region wherein implementation of the 
New York Convention is robust or into a country or region wherein 
implementation of the Convention is either lukewarm or lethargic.  Regrettably, 
current oil prices might very well generate a “who cares” attitude from a state 
confronted with the potential loss of broad foreign investment due to its dispute 
resolution mechanisms. 
One need not be a lyrical optimist to be sanguine about the future prospects for 
commercial arbitration in the Islamic Middle East.  Currently, the “developed” 
world needs Middle Eastern oil and the prospects of international “arm twisting” 
are unlikely.  However, the day will inevitably come when mutual commercial 
interests will intertwine and become so interdependent that international private 
law and Islamic law will stand where neither dominates the other; this day will be 
predicated on a mutual respect and understanding for each body of law, including 
its historical foundations and modern application. 
 
